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ABSTRACT
Security cues found in web browsers are meant to alert users
to potential online threats, yet many studies demonstrate
that security indicators are largely ineffective in this regard.
Those studies have depended upon self-reporting of subjects’
use or aggregate experimentation that correlate responses to
sites with and without indicators.
We report on a laboratory experiment using eye-tracking
to follow the behavior of self-identified computer experts as
they share information across popular social media websites.
The use of eye-tracking equipment allows us to explore pos-
sible behavioral differences in the way experts perceive web
browser security cues, as opposed to non-experts.
Unfortunately, due to the use of self-identified experts,
technological issues with the setup, and demographic anoma-
lies, our results are inconclusive. We describe our initial ex-
perimental design, lessons learned in our experimentation,
and provide a set of steps for others to follow in implement-
ing experiments using unfamiliar technologies, eye-tracking
specifically, subjects with different experience with the lab-
oratory tasks, as well as individuals with varying security
expertise. We also discuss recruitment and how our design
will address the inherent uncertainties in recruitment, as
opposed to design for an ideal population. Some of these
modifications are generalizable, together they will allow us
to run a larger 2x2 study, rather than a study of only experts
using two different single sign-on systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security cues — such as the presence of a lock icon and
additional security certificate information in the browser
chrome and the use of the protocol “https” in the location
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bar — found in web browsers are meant to alert users to
potential online threats, yet there are many studies that
demonstrate that security indicators are largely ineffective
in communicating security information to users. However,
as Schechter et al. demonstrated, users are often unaware of
these cues [13]. Other studies have shown that, even when
users are aware, many people are unsure about how to in-
terpret them, or ignore them. Technical expertise, however,
has been shown to be a mitigating factor in a user’s vulner-
ability to online fraud.
There is evidence that a user’s technical ability is a key
factor in mitigating the risk posed by malicious websites and
email [14, 2, 20, 9]. Yet the methods by which computer se-
curity experts differentiate between malicious and benign
websites and email are not well understood. The goal of
our experimental work was to compare the use of experts
and nonexperts in their use of cues. Previous eye-tracking
studies have examined single population groups to identify
a group’s attention to security cues, making note of tech-
nical expertise, but have not compared the differences be-
tween novice and expert users. While these previous studies
have noted which subjects had computer experience, those
subjects were not tested in separate population groups to
compare their behavior. Larger, survey-based studies show
differences in cognitive tasks, such as card sorting or ac-
curately describing communication channels [3, 18, 7], but
are unable to identify the behavioral components of those
differences.
Our study focuses on single sign-on authentication pro-
tocols. These types of protocols allow a user to use their
account from one site—called the identity provider—to lo-
gin to another site — called the relying party. Given the
proliferation of websites with which users interact, single
sign-on protocols allow users to reduce the number of user-
name/password combinations they have to remember (or,
given that poor password practices are relatively common,
this means users may be reusing the same username/password
combination at fewer sites). This comes at the cost of trust-
ing authentication to a single server. Moreover, login inter-
action becomes more complicated, as three parties — the
user, the relying party, and the identity provider — are now
involved in each login, and the user needs to ensure they are
interacting with the right party at the right time.
We draw on past work on usable security as well as work
in cognitive-neuroscience to design an experiment to iden-
tify the behavioral components of online decision making
processes, especially in the context of user authentication
on the web. Identifying these behaviors will be useful in
identifying the nature of experts’ tacit knowledge when it
comes to making security decisions. It will also allow us to
obtain some insight on the usability of single sign-on authen-
tication.
Our study is designed to identify what sources of informa-
tion and features experts use when evaluating websites. It is
also designed to be mobile, allowing us to collect data from
a wide range of experts. However, instead of our planned
results, we instead have developed a series of guidelines on
how to create an experiment when addressing technical er-
rors, and demographic issues. The errors of researcher op-
timism and resulting errors were resolved in running and
analyzing the experiments; and some of the lessons learned
may be generalizable to other domains beyond eye tracking.
The primary recommendations we have are discussed more
in depth in Section 6. However, the first, and most obvi-
ous, is ensure that one understands the technical limitations
of the equipment and testing environment. When exam-
ining experts and novices, one should have a well devel-
oped method for objectively differentiating between abilities.
When dealing with security, how important is it to minimize
task completion bias—where subjects are more interested in
completing a task than paying attention the security. To
evaluate the attention paid to security, task completion bias
should be minimized. In order to mimic activities of daily
computing, task completion bias should be present and sig-
nificant. Finally, one must be prepared to address extreme
differences in the population from which participants can be
recruited and the actual participant who show up.
We begin by describing the initial motivation for the ex-
periment, in Section 2. We describe our initial assumptions
and methodology in Section 3. We then integrate both the
results and our critique of our implementation. Essentially,
our laboratory experience and training with eye-tracking
was not up to the standard needed for data compilation.
A basic recommendation of this section can be found in the
design of TCP: start slow. In Section 5 we delve into the
problems we experienced in more depth. The Section 6 we
enumerate six findings that are generalizable for the study of
security cues, with a focus on our particular method. Using
these changes in study design, the Indiana team was able
to suggest changes to the protocol to the QUT coauthors
at the Queensland University of Technology. The collabo-
rators were able to run a successful—recently submitted—
experiment comparing experts and novices using the revi-
sions suggested in this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
Web browser security cues.
Several studies have sought to understand how users em-
ploy security cues in web browsers. Whalen and Inkpen used
eye-tracking equipment to examine where users looked when
browsing different websites and found that many users could
identify the location of security indicators, but failed to in-
teract with them [19]. Sobey et al. reported similar results
when they examined users’ responses to extended validation
(EV) SSL certificates as provided by web browser security
cues [15]. A study by Sunshine et al. showed that users will
ignore SSL certificate warnings presented to them by web
browsers [17], confirming of Schechter et al.’s work [13].
Expertise and security decisions.
Previous studies have shown that in some scenarios peo-
ple studying in technical fields are less likely to be decieved
by online threats, and are more likely to understand se-
curity cues. An early study by Friedman et al., exam-
ined three population groups. Their study found that, on a
whole, users from a high-technology neighborhood in Cali-
fornia were able to better describe and identify the correct
representation of an encrypted communication channel, than
communities that were less technical [7].
Similarly, a study by Jagatic et al. showed that students
majoring in technical fields were unlikely to fall for standard
phishing attacks and were roughly half as likely to fall for
spear-phish attacks as students majoring in non-technical
fields [9]. Sobey et al. found that expert users were able to
correctly identify and interpret web browser security indi-
cators [15]. However, Sunshine et al.’s study demonstrated
that experts were more security-aware only in specific situ-
ations [17].
Single sign-on.
Single sign-on protocols allow a user to use their account
from one identity provider to authenticate to multiple re-
lying parties. Several standardized and proprietary single
sign-on protocols exist. Within organizations, single sign-
on has become quite common, and the venerable Kerberos
protocol underlies modern enterprise single sign-on systems
such as Microsoft Active Directory.
Our focus is on the single sign-on on the public Inter-
net. The OpenID protocol [11] is an open standard that has
seen some adoption; one notable feature of OpenID is that
it allows anyone to set up an identity provider, rather than
requiring a small number of centralized identity providers.
The OAuth protocol [1] is a delegated authorization proto-
col which provides services closely related to single sign-on.
There has been significant adoption of OAuth; in 2008, the
social networking site Facebook introduced a single sign-on
featured called Facebook Connect which employs OAuth,
and in 2009 the microblogging site Twitter began requiring
the use of OAuth for all interactions with its API.
Single sign-on systems have been studied to some extent in
the literature. Pashalidis and Mitchell [12] gave a taxonomy
of single sign-on systems. Recently, Sun et al. [16] did a
usability study in which they explored users’ understand and
opinions on single sign-on systems.
3. METHODOLOGY
Our study was designed to expand on previous security us-
ability research by providing an explicit study of computer
experts to ascertain to what extent they utilize web browser
security cues. Compared with previous usability studies on
web browser security cues, our research is notable for ex-
plicitly comparing the behaviors of novices and experts, for
working in the context of single sign-on authentication as op-
posed to direct logins, and for using eye-tracking equipment
to gain additional insight into user behavior.
We conducted a two-part experiment with subjects who
were recruited from the graduate program (Masters and
PhD) at Indiana University’s School of Informatics and Com-
puting. Subjects performed a sequence of eye-tracking tasks
and then completed a survey. Subjects were paid $1 for each
online task completed and $8 dollars for the completion of
the survey, to a maximum of $15. Each subject could with-
draw at any point in the experiment and were paid for the
parts they completed.
We assumed that subjects recruited from this graduate
program would fit the description of Jagatic et al. of having
technical expertise. Jagatic et al.’s study, as well as Fried-
mann’s study demonstrated that general technical expertise
was a good indicator of security awareness [9, 7]. This aware-
ness, however, seems to be limited by task familiarity, as we
find in our results.
The eye-tracking tasks asked subjects to complete a set of
information sharing tasks using either Facebook Connect or
OpenID and Twitter’s single sign-on architecture. The sur-
vey task was designed to collect demographic information,
as well as subjects’ risk and benefit perceptions of sharing in-
formation online. As part of the survey task we also queried
subjects on their reasons for completing or not completing
parts of the eye-tracking task.
Our setup allowed us to run two experiments simultan-
iously within the same lab. However, there were, as we
discovered later, differences in lighting, which affected post-
processing.
3.1 Eye-Tracking Task
Subjects completed an eye-tracking task asking them to
share information via Facebook Connect or OpenID and
Twitter. They were randomly assigned to either the Face-
book Connect tasks or the OpenID and Twitter tasks. The
list of tasks appears in Table 3.1. Moreover, the order of
tasks within the list was also randomly shuffled for each
user. Subjects viewed webpages using Firefox 4.0 on Dell
laptops with 12in monitors running Windows Vista.
We used an eye-tracking device developed by Thomas
Busey at Indiana University’s Department of Psychology
and Brain Science and analyzed the eye-tracking data using
the open source software, Expert Eyes [4]. This eye-tracking
device consists of two cameras mounted on a pair of glasses
which the participant wears, with one camera recording the
subject’s eye movements and the other camera recording the
screen. Via post-processing, the video recordings are corre-
lated and a video is produced showing the subject’s gaze
overlaid on the screen recording. We attempted to reduce
head movement by using a chin rest.
We chose this particular eye-tracking hardware/software
combination due to its portability. Our protocol was meant
to collect data from a large number of subjects with a wide
demographic background, and in many cases subjects are
unable to travel to a university to act as subjects in an ex-
periment. For this particular experiment, we only had IRB
approval to conduct research with experts recruited from
Indiana University. Since then, our protocol has been ex-
panded to allow us to collect data from experts and novices
in many different settings, including security conferences and
the local farmer’s market. This is meant to give us a better
external validity to our study.
Subjects used pregenerated logon information for all ac-
counts to minimize exposure of subjects’ identities. Our
OpenID identity provider was not configured to use SSL,
Figure 1: Sample Calibration Point
thus all OpenID login information was passed unsecured
through HTTP; Facebook and Twitter login did employ
HTTPS on the single sign-on authentication page. After a
subject finished the online tasks, we cleared the web browser’s
cache and deleted all cookies. We informed subjects that
they need not complete the sharing task, but if they did not
complete the task they needed to explain why they did not
do so in the following survey task in order to be paid for the
task.
Before the subjects began the information sharing tasks,
we calibrated the eye-tracking equipment using a series of
dots on which they focused (Figure 1). We repeated the
calibration after the eye-tracking task to ensure that the
equipment did not slip during the task, and to correct for
slippage, if it did occur.
3.2 Survey Task
After subjects had finished the eye-tracking task we asked
them to complete several surveys.
The first survey was a task completion checklist, which
included questions to obtain qualitative information on why
subjects may not have completed a task. For each task, we
asked subjects to inform us if they were able to complete
an online task. For those tasks which the subjects did not
complete, we asked them to give us a reason for why they
could not complete the task. This allowed us to identify
difficulties in our online tasks, as well as possible security
reasons subjects declined to finish a given task.
The second survey collected subjects’ demographic infor-
mation. The information collected included gender, age,
household income, and education level, as well as how often
subjects used the internet and their browser and operating
systems preferences.
For the third survey, subjects were randomly assigned to
complete one of two possible surveys: either a survey asking
subjects to report their perceptions of the risks of sharing
information online, or a survey on subjects’ perceptions of
the benefits of sharing information online. For this study, we
used the online task portion, the demographic information,
and a rudimentary analysis of subjects’ risk/benefit percep-
tions. A more thorough investigation of the risk/benefit por-
tion is part of another, ongoing study.
Facebook OpenID and Twitter
Share a story on CNN using Facebook Connect (F1) Post a comment on LiveJournal using OpenID (O1)
Comment on a CNN story using Facebook Connect (F2) Post a comment on a blog at Blogspot using OpenID (O2)
Post a comment on LiveJournal using Facebook Connect(F3) Post a review on SourceForge using OpenID (O3)
Rate a movie on RottenTomatoes and post it on Facebook (F4) Share a story on CNN using Twitter (O4)
Share an item from Amazon using Facebook Connect (F5) Comment on a CNN story using Twitter (O5)
Login to Yahoo! Mail using Facebook Connect (F6) Share an item from Amazon on Twitter (O6)
Import friends from Yahoo! Mail into Facebook (F7) Rate a movie on RottenTomatoes and post a story about it
on Twitter (O7)
Table 1: List of information sharing tasks for eye-tracking task.
Age Male Female
19-25 9 1
26-30 2 1
31-35 1 0
Table 2: Age ranges given by subjects.
Household Income Male Female
x < 10000 3 0
10000 < x < 20000 5 0
20000 < x < 30000 2 0
50000 < x < 75000 1 1
Don’t Know 1 1
Table 3: Household Income reported by subjects.
4. RESULTS AND TECHNICAL ISSUES
We conducted the experiment on 14 subjects (12 male,
2 female), all of whom completed the entire experiment.
Most subjects were between the ages of 19 and 25 (Table 2).
Household income was highly variable with income ranging
from less than $10,000 to at most $75,000, with most sub-
jects making between $10,000 and $20,000 (Table 3). All
subjects were graduate students at the School of Informat-
ics and Computing at Indiana University, but most subjects
had completed at least one year of a master’s degree (Table
4).
All subjects used the internet on a daily basis and most
were familiar with multiple web browsers and operating sys-
tems (Tables 5 and 6). Chrome was the most popular ex-
clusive browser, with three subjects reporting only using
Chrome. Windows was the most popular exclusive oper-
ating system with two subjects exclusively using Windows.
No one exclusively used a Linux OS.
Our initial recruitment of subjects focused on graduate
students, and given the broad experience demonstrated us-
ing various web browsers and operating systems, we feel they
represent good examples of technical expertise, not necessar-
ily computer security expertise. In Jagatic et. al, found that
technical expertise was capable of mitigating the threat of
Education Level Male Female
College Graduate 3 0
Master’s Degree 6 2
Ph.D. 3 0
Table 4: Education levels reported by subjects.
Web Browser Male Female
Firefox 5 2
IE 5 1
Safari 3 0
Opera 1 0
Chrome 10 1
Table 5: Number of subjects using a given web
browser.
OS Male Female
Windows 9 1
Macinotsh 7 1
Linux 5 2
Table 6: Number of subjects using a given OS.
phishing attacks, however, we found that this expertise is
highly contextual [9].
4.1 Eye-Tracking Issues
Luckily, we only have one non-human related technical is-
sue. On the first subject we ran, one of the wires in the
camera was loose, leading to interesting footage of that sub-
ject’s eye. However, after that subject was done, we fixed
the eye-tracking equipment and the problem was resolved.
4.1.1 Problems with Small Screens
One of the critical limitations we ran into was the use of a
laptops with overly small monitors. While subjects were able
to complete the tasks, the cameras were not of a high enough
resolution to capture more accurate information from the
screen. This resulted in a significant amount of guessing of
the location of a subject’s gaze, which was crucial to our
experiment.
Another problem with the small screen size was it pulled
subjects’ gaze overly downward. This led to significant parts
of the data becoming inaccessible because we could not cre-
ate an eyefit model when the pupil was obscured (Figure 2.
This sort of data error occurred in 7 of the remaining 13
subjects, and —removing our protocol aware subject— 6 of
the 12 subjects were afflicted. In some of the cases, we could
still extract some information, but it made the eye fit model
much more complicated.
4.1.2 Focus and Lighting Issues
We had focus issues in three cases, two of these cases
were in data that had not been affected by the previously
mentioned difficulties. We either positioned the eye camera
too far from the subject’s eye, or focused on the wrong part
Figure 2: No, this person is not asleep. They’re
trying to complete the online tasks. The pupil is
obscured making calibration of the eye gaze difficult.
of the subject’s eye. In these cases, we also noticed that our
second setup was not as well lit as the first computer setup.
This led to grainy resolution, which confused Expert Eyes
when trying to identify pupil locations.
The Expert Eyes software uses dark-pupil illumination to
detect the location of the pupil against the rest of the eye [4].
Thus, when there is not enough contrast between the pupil
and the background (Figure ??), it is difficult to produce a
good eye-fit model.
Altogether, the various technical issues resulted in only
two eyetracking subjects’ data being completely analyzed.
One of these knew the protocol leading to an effective sam-
ple size of one. This required us to rely on informal ob-
servations rather than accurate data. These informal ob-
servations, however, led to important realizations about our
survey methodology and demographic issues.
4.1.3 Online Task Completion
Most subjects were able to complete the Facebook tasks,
at least after instruction. There were two subjects that had
difficulty due to technical issues when trying to complete
the Facebook tasks. See Table 7 for the exact numerical
results. The reasons given for not being able to complete
the Facebook tasks were:
1. “The password is always wrong” (F1)
2. “There was some problem with the facebook password.
It kept asking password everytime while trying to share
even after logging in” (F5)
On the otherhand, subjects seemed to have great difficulty
in completing the OpenID and Twitter tasks. In particular,
the OpenID tasks proved troublesome to subjects. Task O1
only had 60% online completion, while tasks O2 and O3
were only completed by 40% of the subjects. The Twitter
tasks, however, were completed by all subjects assigned the
OpenID and Twitter tasks.
The online completion of OpenID tasks is slightly less dis-
appointing as our knowledgable subject was selected for the
OpenID and Twitter tasks. That subject was able to cor-
rectly identify the lack of security in our OpenID identity
Task Completed Online Completed on Survey
F1 8 1
F2 9 0
F3 9 0
F4 9 0
F5 8 1
F6 9 0
F7 9 0
Table 7: Number and method of subjects complet-
ing each Facebook task.
Task Complete Online Completed on Survey
O1 3 1
O2 2 2
O3 2 2
O4 4 0
O5 4 0
O6 4 0
O7 4 0
Table 8: Number and method of subjects complet-
ing OpenID and Twitter tasks.
provider, and listed that as the reason for not completing
those tasks. Table 8 shows the results when we remove
the knowledgeable subject from the data. However, remov-
ing the knowledgeable subject meant that we were left with
only four subjects being selected for the OpenID and Twit-
ter tasks — less than half of the subjects chosen for the
Facebook tasks.
Aside from the security reasons given by our knowledge-
able subject, subjects’ reasons for not completing the online
task were:
1. “I thought the jobs were done. I did not realize the
task is not complete.” (O1-O3)
2. “OpenID didn’t work.” (O2)
3. “The account did not have credentials to review a project.”
(O3)
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Variability in Subjects Risk Perception for the First 8 Risks
Name Address Phone Number Social Security Number Birthday w/Year Birthday w/o Year Gender Sexual Orientation
Figure 3: Subjects’ risk perception of the first eight
categories given. 1 is least amount of risk; 7 is great-
est.
4.2 Demographic and Human Factors
In addition to the disappointing male-female ratios in our
study, most subjects were either from India or China. Face-
book is not the primary social networking site in either of
those countries. This meant that in most cases, we had to
instruct subjects on how to navigate Facebook, OpenID, or
Twitter in order for them to be able to complete the tasks.
Our instruction led to an unnatural use environment that,
given our informal observations, distracted subjects. For ex-
ample, in four subjects we noticed that the subjects were fol-
lowing our fingers as we showed them which buttons to click
on to share stories and comment on CNN. Normal browsing
habits do not typically involve following a human’s finger as
they tell one where to click.
4.2.1 Risk/Benefit Perceptions
We performed a rudimentary analysis of the subjects’ risk
and benefit perceptions to acertain any consensus in how
subjects percieve sharing information online. Subjects were
asked rate a collection of 17 different information categories
on either its perceived risk or benefit when sharing that in-
formation online. Each category could take a value from 1
– least beneficial/risky – to 7 –most beneficial/risky.
In terms of risk, there was strong agreement that sharing
social security numbers (Figure 3) and credit card informa-
tion (Figure 4)was risky, while sharing marital status and
nationality were viewed as low risk (Figure 4). In terms of
benefits, however, there was little consensus. It appears that
there is a fairly strong agreement that sharing one’s gender
online is of moderately high benefit (Figure 5).
5. DISCUSSION
This choice of technology for this study was a key part of
the design. We chose the eye-tracking equipment because of
its portability. This will allow us to gather data from a wider
variety of experts and novices in different locations, leading
to greater external validity. However, the choice to gather
data from a diverse population also exposed limitations in
our methodology.
Our inexperience with the technology was a hinderance
to data collection, but it does highlight the necessity in un-
derstanding the equipment. More importantly though, it
demonstrates the need to control the experimental environ-
ment to ensure that the results are valid. The failure to
control our laboratory environment due to unforseen cir-
l
l l
l
l
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Variability in Subjects Risk Perception for the Last 9 Risks
Political Affiliation Religious Beliefs Martital Status Photographs Videos Blogs Credit Card Information Ethnicity Nationality
Figure 4: Subjects’ risk perception of the last nine
categories given. 1 is least amount of risk; 7 is great-
est.
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Variability in Subjects' Benefit Perception for the First 8 Categories
Name Address Phone Number Social Security Number Birthday w/Year Birthday w/o Year Gender Sexual Orientation
Figure 5: Subjects’ benefit perception of the first
eight categories given. 1 is least amount of benefit;
7 is greatest.
cumstances is a critical learning experience for adapting the
equipment to mobile data collection.
For example, our use of two testing areas allowed us to
collect data more quickly, but it illuminated the difficulties
in controlling lighting. The lighting became an issue because
our subjects were unfamiliar with the tasks and required
our instruction to complete the tasks. Our presence behind
subjects, while instructing them, obscured the light in one of
the two testing locations. If our subjects were familiar with
how to complete the tasks, we may not have discovered the
problems until we began mobile data collection.
The desire to collect data from a diverse population also
underscored the necessity for objective and culturally aware
metrics. Our experiment limited users to Firefox 4.0 and
Windows Vista, but, as our results show, only half of the
subjects used Firefox as a browser. Moreover, most of our
subjects were unfamiliar with Facebook and OpenID.
Ideally, we would like only subjects familiar with the tech-
nologies being tested, as suggested in Section 6. However, it
may be more informative to identify subject reported famil-
iarity with the technologies being tested. This would lead to
more complicated data analysis, but might also help identify
differences in security expertise and task expertise.
Another consideration is incentive. We paid subjects $1
for each online task completed. Completion of a task—as
we instructed subjects—was either doing the task online, or
explaining to us why they did not complete the task on-
line. This may have induced subjects to complete the tasks,
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Variability in Subjects' Benefit Perception for the Last 9 Categories
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Figure 6: Subjects’ benefit perception of the last
nine categories given. 1 is least amount of benefit;
7 is greatest.
rather than pay attention to security cues. We mention in
Section 6 that the option used in Queensland University of
Technology was to pay subjects the full amount regardless
of how many tasks they completed.
In work by Busey et al., however, they chose not to pay
subjects at all [5]. This allowed them to recruit subjects
that were self-motivated to participate, rather than inticing
subjects. This would have the advantage of limiting moti-
vational biases in task completion.
Our study used generated identies for subjects, rather
than having subjects use their own credentials. This may
have lead subjects to pay less attention to the security cues
as their was no possible damage to their accounts. We sug-
gest in Section 6 that users should use their own accounts
if they want, but provide them with generated accounts if
they either do not want to use their own, or if they do not
have accounts for the technologies being studied.
Another aspect of experts and novices that emerged in
thinking about the data was speed of information acquisi-
tion. Security usability eye-tracking studies generally look
at whether subjects look at security cues provided by the
browser, and for how long. As we discussed further ways
to analyze the data, it was mentioned that experts may not
observe cues for as long as novices, and that it may be diffi-
cult to find clusters of viewing patterns because experts can
pick out information much quicker than novices [10].
This phenomena has been demonstrated in many different
fields from igo—an oriental strategy game—to finger print
identification [8, 21]. This suggests that further research into
experts and novices in computer security may not be able
to find any significant differences between gaze locations,
or even gaze durations, but that the dynamics of the gaze
patterns may be a more accurate indicator of the differences
between the groups [21]. While we did not incorporate a
method for analyzing the gaze dynamics in our Queensland
University of Technology study, we are working with Tom
Busey to develop a methodology to use for our existing data
and data we acquire in the future.
This type of behavior also suggests further avenues of re-
search in usable security. For example, if experts are tak-
ing in security information from security cues in browser
chrome, do they suffer from change blindness making them
more susceptible (or just as bad as novices) when the secu-
rity cues are spoofed [6]?
Security expertise
Total
Expert Novice
Computer Expert 5 4 9
proficiency Novice 4 6 10
Total 9 10 19
Table 9: Classification of experts and novices
Security expertise
Total
Expert Novice
Computer Expert 6 4 10
proficiency Novice 0 9 9
Total 6 13 19
Table 10: Revised classification of experts and
novices
5.1 Further Discussion in Light of Subsequent
Submission
Our adjusted research methodology, while it did produce
data, it failed to identify any statsitically significant differ-
ences between security experts and novices. However, dur-
ing the review process, we recieved many useful comments.
These comments referred primarily to an artifact of our re-
designed survey methodology.
Our redesigned survey measured compentency in a variety
of computer and computer security related areas, including
understanding of single sign-on. However, the results were
curious (Table 9) in that we ended up with subjects that had
computer security expertise, but no computer expertise.
The comments we received helped us further address our
methodology. When we incorporated the reviewers sugges-
tions, our analysis not only made more sense (Table 10), but
because we classified subjects more sensibly, our analysis of
the eye tracking data also made more sense.
Finally, with more a more sensible means for classifying,
the new eye tracking data that we captured revealed sev-
eral group differences based on duration of gaze, number of
gazes, and task. Our second revised methodology and the re-
sults are in the process of preparation for submission. Thus,
while our initial methodology failed, and our second was
inconclusive, our third methodology — revised by conversa-
tions between co-authors in response to reviewers’ comments
— was finally able to tease apart the phenomenom we were
trying to study.
6. CHANGES TO STUDY DESIGN
In addition to ensuring that the technical issues observed
in Section 4 are resolved, we make several recommendations
on how the study design should be changed to obtain valu-
able results.
1. Ensure a sufficiently diverse study population. Our
study participants were mostly from either China or
India, where Facebook was not the primary online so-
cial network, and thus participants were unfamiliar
with using Facebook. Recruitment for this type of
study should focus on users that regularly employ the
social networking tools used in the study.
In any study, prepare for unexpected distributions of
participants, and attempt to over-recruit.
2. Where possible, have participants use their own login
credentials. In our study, participants were provided
with pre-generated usernames and passwords so that
they did not have to use their own login credentials.
This is beneficial from a privacy perspective as sub-
jects do not risk revealing personal information during
the study. However, previous research, such as that by
Schechter et al. [13], has shown that participants using
their own login credentials tend to be more security-
aware than participants using provided login creden-
tials. This requires greater sensitivity in data handling
to protect participant privacy and obtain ethics ap-
proval, but may place participants in a more realistic
setting.
3. Classify subjects as experts or novices based on re-
sponses to skill-testing questions rather than self-reported
opinions. Subjects were classified as experts or novices
based on their self-reported expertise. Individuals may
have different opinions on what qualifies as expertise
or may be biased about their own expertise.
Research in security usability would benefit from a
standardized instrument assessing technical expertise.
4. Include non-single-sign-on tasks to obtain baseline in-
formation on use of security cues. Our study was de-
signed to assess how subjects use security cues during
single sign-on, but our study protocol did not include
any tasks that involved authentication without single
sign-on. As a result, we are unable to compare whether
participants use security cues in single sign-on more or
less than in direct authentication (non-single-sign-on)
settings.
5. Allow users to choose which web browser to use. Indi-
viduals use different web browsers, with no web browser
currently having more than 30% market share. As a re-
sult, requiring subjects to use one web browser reduces
the ecological validity of the study. Allowing subjects
to choose which web browser to use would place them
in a more natural computing environment, albeit at
the cost of greater complexity in data analysis.
6. Pay subjects regardless of number of tasks completed.
We originally chose to pay subjects on a per-task basis
to induce subjects to complete the study instead of
collecting their money and walking away. However,
this can introduce a task focus, where subjects aim to
complete the required tasks with little heed to other
factors. This is particularly problematic in the context
of security research, as task-focused-users may ignore
security cues with their focus on task completion.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of the original experiment was to present moti-
vating background work and an innovative way to explore
the differences in experts and novices in terms of their use
of security indicators. Indeed the second experiment did,
hopefully, reach these goals. Serendipitously the experiment
we developed had been expected to be implemented in two
cultural contexts; however, the initial context remains unex-
plored. However, during our learning process we developed a
set of heuristics to guide the remaining experimentation. We
enumerate those above. In addition we recommend a slow
start, with one or two participants for unpublished experi-
mentation to begin. Our recommendation that there be a
uniform instrument for assessing technical expertise is prob-
lematic. Those standard evaluation instruments become ar-
chaic almost more quickly than these can be accepted in the
academy. Due to the rate of change in technology, a differ-
ent approach to standardized instruments is needed. This is
exacerbated that such an instrument would ideally integrate
computer science, psychology, security, and sociology.
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